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Abstract  
Investigations of white collar crimes such as corruption are often hindered by the lack of information or 
physical evidence.  However, vast amount of information recorded, stored, analyzed, and shared using 
information and communication technologies (ICT) by businesses, governments, and citizens may help in 
investigating and prosecuting these crimes, and in deterring future crimes. This paper investigates the 
relationship between ICT and corruption at the country level using the theoretical lens of general 
deterrence theory. Using time-lagged regression and multilevel analysis of country level data from 97 
countries for the years 2011-2013, we demonstrate that countries with higher ICT penetration and higher 
rule of law tend to have lesser corruption after accounting for social, economic, and political controls. 
Keywords: Corruption, ICT penetration, General Deterrence Theory, Multilevel Analysis 
Introduction  
Corruption is rampant in modern society. More than one trillion dollars are paid in bribes every year 
(UNODC 2005). A survey of 1000 people from 107 countries found that more than 27% of respondents 
paid bribes in their countries when dealing with public officials (Global Corruption Barometer 2013). 
Illicit financial flows in the developing countries  as the result of bribery, corruption or tax evasion 
amounted to 1.26 trillion dollars  in 2011 alone and are increasing at the rate of 10 percent per annum 
(Kar and Freitas 2013). Foreign investors interested in investing in a relatively corrupt country can 
experience a 20% increase in their business costs due to corruption (UNODC 2005). A report by 
Transparency International notes that more than two-thirds of 177 countries have a corruption score 
below 50 on a 0-10 scale where 0 represents highest corruption (Transparency International 2011). The 
report warns of rampant abuse of power, secret dealings, and bribery in the global society.  
Corruption is defined as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain” (Bhargava 2006; Transparency 
International 2011). This includes bribery, extortion, collusion, fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, 
trading influence, illicit enrichment, obstruction of justice, abuse of function, and money laundering. This 
definition suggests that corruption may take several forms, and is not limited to bribing a judge or public 
official.   
Despite its widespread occurrence, investigation and prosecution of corrupt business people and 
government officials is difficult due to lack of observable evidence. Unlike traditional crimes such as 
homicide where there are physical and forensic evidence, such evidence is often lacking in corruption or 
other white-collar crime investigations (Gottschalk et al. 2011). Corruption investigations often follow 
unauthorized financial trails, whistleblower accounts, and wiretapped conversations, which may be 
inadmissible in courts of law. Corrupt officials try to avoid detection by using cash transactions and 
avoiding electronic communication.  Moreover, individuals involved in corrupt acts are often educated, 
wealthy, respected, and socially influential, with strong political connections, which they leverage to 
escape prosecution, especially in countries with weak legal frameworks (OECD 2010).  When corrupt 
individuals walk free, the society bears the cost of their corruption in the form of resources siphoned out 
of public welfare for private wealth creation, harming the citizenry at large. 
 ICT and Corruption 
  
 Twenty-first Americas Conference on Information Systems, Puerto Rico, 2015 2 
Since combating corruption requires acquiring and processing information that is hard to obtain, ICT 
tools that enables the acquisition, storage, and processing of information may play a role in curbing 
corruption (Blurton 1999).  ICT refers to “a diverse set of technological tools and resources used to 
communicate, create, disseminate, store, and manage information” (Charoensukmongkol and Moqbel 
2014).  These tools and resources include computer hardware, networks, software, telephony, mobile and 
satellite systems, surveillance tools, databases, data mining programs, and so forth. Information resources 
acquired using ICT tools can help in the investigation of the white-collar crimes in multiple ways. First, 
investigating accounting fraud is now easier due to the internal control procedures embedded in auditing 
systems.   Second, ICT can enable multiagency collaboration that may be necessary for prosecuting white 
collar crimes. Third, ICT tools provide whistleblowers with the opportunity to expose corruption through 
anonymous tips, blogs, and websites like WikiLeaks.  In light of the above expectations, the research 
question of interest to this study is: Can increased ICT penetration reduce or deter corruption at the 
country level, and if so, why?  
We investigate the above research question using the theoretical lens of general deterrence theory (Gibbs 
1975) – a theory from the field of criminal justice that explains why people commit crimes, and what 
strategies can help deter such crimes. Hypotheses postulated using this theory are then tested using 
country level data from a sample of 97 countries for the years 2011-2013.   
Literature Review 
A meta-analysis of 42 empirical studies on corruption from 1995-2006 (Judge et al. 2011) found that 
corruption is a social, political, and economic problem and that political, legal, and economic institutions 
are important for constraining corrupt activities (Collier 2002).  The literature suggests several factors 
that may be related to corruption. Poor citizens are more susceptible to corruption and bribery (Serra 
2006). Exposure to international trade exchange has negative effect on corruption (Treisman 2000). 
Global corruption has negative relationship with judicial efficiency and economic freedom and positively 
related to foreign aid and government size (Ali and Isse 2002). Political stability and legitimate legal 
system can act as a deterrent to corruption (Park 2003). The presence of large network of media on 
Internet can deter corruption (Goel et al. 2012), while maturity of e-government services has a negative 
effect on corruption (Krishnan et al. 2013).  
A few studies have explored the relationship between ICT and corruption.  Usually, such studies focus on 
a specific ICT application like e-government, rather than ICT in general (e.g., Krishnan et al. 2013; 
Andersen 2000). Castells (2000) suggests that ICT can reduce corruption by decentralizing power but 
does not provide any empirical evidence for the proposed relationship.  Lio et al. (2011) show that the 
level of Internet adoption in a country is negatively related to its level of corruption. Charoensukmongkol 
and Moqbel (2014) observe that ICT investment reduces corruption up to a certain extent but excess ICT 
investments may create new avenues for corruption (Charoensukmongkol and Moqbel 2014). Bertot et al. 
(2012) note that ICT can create an atmosphere of openness that can help identify and deter corrupt 
behavior, but the extent to which ICT can lead to a culture of transparency and openness is unclear. Goel 
et al. (2012) suggest that Internet creates corruption awareness, which in turn, deters corruption. 
A field study found that corporate ICT applications such as ERP systems can (a) use embedded 
procedures to compel employees to follow a disciplined approach, and (b) the integrated nature of data 
stored in such systems leads to greater data visibility that assists proper monitoring (Elmes et al. 2005). 
Deploying such systems can help businesses detect inconsistencies in employee work and/or flow of funds 
that may be linked to corrupt activities. ICT usage by businesses and government organizations also 
increases the accountability of employees as their actions, movements, and transactions are recorded, and 
available to supervisors, news media, and independent audit agencies upon request (Elmes et al. 2005). If 
employees perceive that their actions are visible to others, their tendency to follow rules and standard 
procedures will increase (Foucault 1977).  
However, most of the above studies are correlational (rather than explanatory), non-cumulative (i.e., 
don’t build on prior studies) and atheoretical.  In addition, corruption research is beset with conflicting 
conceptualizations and varying measurements of the corruption construct, making it difficult to compare 
findings across studies (Goel et al. 2012).  We address these gaps in the literature by employing a 
theoretical approach to building hypotheses linking ICT and corruption in the next section. 
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Theory and Hypothesis 
In order to examine if ICT is indeed an effective deterrent for corruption, we employ general deterrence 
theory (GDT) from the criminal justice literature.  This theory examines why people commit crimes and 
what can be done to prevent crimes.  GDT assumes that criminals are not pathological or disturbed 
individual who need help or psychological counselling, but rather perfectly rational people whose criminal 
acts can be explained by a cost-benefit analysis.  If the expected cost of committing a crime is lower than 
its expected benefits, criminals are more likely to commit the crime.  Conversely, if the expected cost is 
higher, they are less likely to engage in criminal activity (Gibbs 1975).   
A central assumption of GDT is the rationality of human behavior.  While such rationality may be lacking 
in violent crimes like homicide where criminals may act in a fit of rage or under the influence of drugs, 
this assumption is reasonable for white collar crimes such as bribery and corruption that often involve 
careful and deliberate planning.  According to this theory, criminal acts can be deterred by increasing the 
expected costs of committing a crime, such as by increasing its perceived certainty, swiftness, and severity 
of punishment (Gibbs 1975). Hence, techniques that increase the certainty of punishment (e.g., increased 
police patrol in high crime areas, using drug-sniffing dogs), its swiftness (e.g., using fast track or special 
courts), and severity (e.g., capital punishment, mandatory minimum sentencing, “three strikes law”) can 
deter criminal activities. 
GDT’s historic origins date back to the works of classical philosophers Thomas Hobbes (1588-1678), 
Cesare Beccaria (1738-1794), and Jeremy Bentham (1738-1842) (Bosworth 2005). While previous 
philosophers like Thomas Aquinas insisted that people naturally do good rather than evil, in Levinthan, 
first published in 1651, Hobbes argued that people are neither good nor evil, but rather creatures of their 
own volition. In the Hobbesian view, people pursue their self-interests, such as material gain, personal 
safety, and social reputation (Bosworth 2005). During this pursuit, they may encroach upon the rights 
and safety of others, creating conflict and war, without a fitting government to protect the rights and 
safety for all. To avoid war, conflict, and crime, people enter into a “social contract” with the government, 
granting the sovereign the use of force to uphold the social contract in return for protection from human 
predicaments. But crimes may still occur even after governments perform their duties, and to deter such 
crime, Hobbes argued that the punishment for crimes must be greater than the benefits derived from 
criminal acts. 
In Dei Delitti e delle Pene (On Crimes and Punishment), published in 1764, Beccaria argued that 
punishments are unjust and repressive when their severity exceeds what is necessary to achieve 
deterrence, punishment should be proportion to the crime committed, and torture and secret detentions 
should be eliminated (Bosworth 2005). However, be maintained that people are rationally self-interested 
and will avoid crimes if the cost of committing crimes exceed their benefits. In this view, it is not the 
excessive severity of punishment, but rather swift and certain punishment are the best means of 
controlling crime. Beccaria argued that laws should be published so that people are aware of their purpose 
and intent, and the process by which justice will be served. 
Bentham extended the pleasure-pain calculus of his predecessors and the role of the state in An 
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, published in 1780. Bentham (1948) argued that 
“nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure” (p. 125), 
and that the duty of the state is “to promote the happiness of society, by punishing and rewarding” (p. 
189). He suggested that punishment is evil unless it is used to avert a greater evil or to control the act of 
offenders. 
Drawing from the works of Hobbes, Beccaria, and Bentham, GDT emphasizes three components of 
punishment: severity, certainty, and swiftness (Bosworth 2005). Certainty implies making potential 
criminals aware that crimes will be punished.  This includes enacting laws that allow uniform prosecution 
of all crimes, and informing the public of these laws, such as by posting signs such as “Trespassers will be 
prosecuted.”  Swiftness implies building a system for handling large volumes of criminal offenses in an 
efficient manner, such as by establishing special courts and statues of limitations for crimes. Severity 
implies ensuring a punishment that is proportional to the nature of the crime and is consistent with the 
norms of fairness and justice. This includes categorizing crimes under different classes of misdemeanors 
and felonies and establishing sentencing guidelines for each class so as to reduce ambiguity and 
arbitrariness in the judicial process. 
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Punishment and deterrence has been practiced as a social practice for at least the last 2,000 years of 
human civilization. In the absence of formal laws during the medieval ages, public executions were used 
to convey the severity of punishment to the public and the offender’s family members. Although outlawed 
in Western countries, public caning is still practiced in many countries for minor crimes such as public 
intoxication and lewd behavior. In Saddam Hussain’s Iraq, people who committed acts against the state 
were punished by amputation of arms, legs, and ears. With advancements in jurisprudence, laws became 
formalized and documented, at least for most traditional crimes.  However, this continues to be a 
limitation for many white-collar crimes, where prosecution is difficult, let alone establishing severity, 
certainty, and swiftness of punishment. 
Can ICT deter white collar crimes such as corruption by affecting the severity, certainty, or swiftness of 
punishment for such crimes? The severity of punishment for corruption is established by social and legal 
norms of a country and is beyond the scope of ICT. Likewise, swiftness depends on the amount of 
caseload to be investigated and processed. However, ICT can ensure the certainty of punishment for 
corruption in three ways: 
• Surveillance: ICT tools such as wiretapping, global positioning systems, spy camera, and sensors 
have made it possible to capture data unobtrusively, without human intervention and often 
without the offender’s knowledge, and monitor the flow of information and funds between 
different parties on the Internet (Hartle et al. 2011; Levine 2011).  For example, magnetic access 
cards record employees’ times of entry and exit from workplace premises, as well as their access 
to secure corporate assets such as server rooms.  Database logs are used to monitor employees’ 
access to and modification of organizational databases and applications.  Surveillance may extend 
beyond corporate premises.  Investigative journals use spycams to record government officials 
accepting bribes, and even ordinary citizens have used smartphones to record instances of police 
brutality.  In 2010, WikiLeaks, an international non-profit organization, released 400,000 
classified military documents of the Iraq war, along with video footage of airstrikes in Baghdad 
that they obtained by hacking into secure US government websites.  Surveillance tools provide the 
means for capturing data that is needed to build a compelling case against white-collar criminals. 
• Data storage, retrieval and analysis:  Advancements in ICT help store, process, and share vast 
amounts of data needed to prosecute white collar crimes.  Today, databases are capable of storing 
hundreds of terabytes of data, in structured or unstructured form (e.g., files, images, video 
evidence), and provide means for searching and mining that data, and distributing it upon 
request among  multiple parties involved in corruption investigations. Governments are already 
utilizing social network data for criminal investigation and prosecutions (Levine 2011).Crime 
mapping and analysis facilitated by data are changing the way police department operate 
(Manning 2008; Elizabeth 2014). Data based policing complements police knowledge and 
experience and helps the law enforcement agencies do their work better (Greengard 2012). 
• Building public awareness:  Lastly, widespread media coverage of corruption cases by virtue of 
the Internet and social media networks creates public awareness of often hidden white-collar 
crimes. This awareness helps mobilize public support for prosecuting high-profile corruption 
cases, further increasing the certainly that those crimes will be punished. As examples, evidence 
obtained through ICT did help with prosecuting several white collar crimes such as Bernie 
Madoff’s Ponzi scheme (for which he received a 150-year prison term), former Worldcom CEO 
Bernard Ebbers’ illegal corporate accounting (25 year term), and hedge fund owner Raj 
Rajaratman’s insider trading activities (11-year term).  
There is some empirical support on the negative relationship between ICT and corruption (e.g., Castells 
2000; Bertot et al. 2012), while others (e.g., Charoensukmongkol and Moqbel 2014) have shown that ICT 
may simultaneously reduce corruption and also create new avenues for corruption.  Some studies note 
that specific types of ICT such as e-government (Krishnan et al. 2013; Andersen 2000) and Internet (Lio 
et al. 2011; Goel et al.(2012) reduce country-level corruption, while corporate ICT applications such as 
ERP (Elmes et al. 2005) discourage employee corruption within firms. In light of the above expectations, 
we hypothesize: 
H1: ICT penetration in a country is negatively related to its overall level of corruption.  
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GDT also argues that if the level of punishment for a certain crime is high, it will increase the cost of 
criminal behavior and deter potential offenders from engaging in criminal acts.  This expectation leads us 
to hypothesize: 
H2: Penalties against corrupt individuals is negatively related to the level of corruption in a country.  
Figure 1 illustrates our two hypotheses. From prior research, we know that corruption is correlated with 
social, economic, and political factors (Judge et al. 2011).  In particular, poverty, literacy, and political 
stability have been found to be negatively related to the level of corruption (Triesman 2000; Blurton 1999; 
Gupta 1998).  For instance, corruption tends to be more predominant in poor countries (an economic 
problem) and in countries with higher illiteracy rates (a social problem), where the citizens have either 
more pressing economic issues to attend or lack technical skills needed to utilize anti-corruption ICT 
tools.  Likewise, political instability (e.g., armed conflict, social unrest, lawlessness) in some countries 
may divert public attention away from corruption to more exigent political problems.  Since these factors 
vary across countries, to control for their potential effects on the dependent variable, we include gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita, literacy rate, and political stability as control variables in our research 
model.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Research Model 
 
Research Methods  
We tested the proposed hypotheses using archival data aggregated from multiple sources. The choice of 
secondary data was motivated by: (a) the difficult and infeasibility of collecting primary data on 
corruption across various countries of the world, and (b) availability of data from reputable third-party 
sources such as Transparency International, Global IT Report, and the World Bank. Table A1 in the 
appendix describes our construct measures, sources, and sample component dimensions of each 
construct.   
Corruption was assessed using two measures: control of corruption (COC) as measured by Worldwide 
Governance Indicator (Worldwide Governance Indicator 2012), and Corruption Perception Index (CPI) as 
measured by Transparency International (2011). We chose two different measures because there is a wide 
diversity in corruption measures used in prior research and consequently findings reported in many 
studies are inconsistent with each other.  Although CPI is a more popular measure of corruption, we 
wanted to see if our analysis was robust to the choice of our corruption measure, hence our selection of 
COC as a second measure.  CPI is an index from 0 (high corruption) to 10 (low corruption) that takes into 
account factors such as accountability of public funds, executives, and public employees, information 
access to society, government control over corruption, bribery, anti-corruption initiatives, and so forth.  
COC is an index ranging from -2.5 (high corruption) to +2.5 (low corruption), which takes into account 
Controls (Social, 
Political, 
Economic) 
EXTENT OF 
CORRUPTION 
ICT 
PENETRATION 
PENALTY FOR 
CORRUPTION 
H1 (-) 
H2 (-) 
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corruption among public officials, diversion of public funds, level of corruption, and so forth. Note that 
both COC and CPI are reverse-scaled, meaning that high values indicate low levels of corruption and vice 
versa. 
ICT penetration was measured using the total ICT usage sub-index (ICT) from the Global IT Report 
(Dutta and Osorio 2012).  This index aggregates ICT penetration among individuals, businesses, and 
government on a scale of 0 (low penetration) to 10 (high penetration).Individual penetration examines 
factors such as number of mobile phone subscriptions, number of people using the Internet, households 
with Internet access, and so forth.  Business penetration considers factors such as firm-level technology 
absorption, business Internet use, extent of staff training, and so forth.  Government penetration includes 
government prioritization of ICT, government online service index, and so forth. 
Penalty for corruption was measured using the rule of law (ROL) measure from Transformation Index 
(Transformation Index BTI 2012). This 0 (low penalty) to 10 (high penalty) measure includes dimensions 
such as prosecution of office abuse, separation of power, independence of judiciary, and so forth. 
Three control variables were also included in our analysis.  Literacy rate (LIT), a social control, was 
measured using (Worldbank 2014) as the percentage of population aged 15 and higher who can read, 
write, and understand a short, simple statement of their everyday life.  GDP per capita, an economic 
control, was also measured using World Bank data as the gross value added by all resident producers of 
the economy minus taxes and subsidies, divided by the country’s population (Worldbank 2014). Political 
stability (PS), a political control, was derived from Worldwide Governance Indicator (2012), which 
included metrics such as the extent of armed conflict, violent demonstrations, social unrest, and so forth. 
After pooling together measures of our constructs of interest, we obtained matched data on 97 nations for 
the years 2010-2012 for predictor variables (lagged predictors) and 2011-2013 for the dependent variable 
(CPI/COC). CPI for 2012 and 2013 was measured on 0-100 point scale, hence we rescaled it to a 0-10 
point scale for the analysis. Since, literacy rate (LIT) data is not updated each year we used latest value of 
LIT for each country. The rule of law (ROL) measure is available only for 2010 and 2012, and hence we 
interpolated it for 2011. Our analysis did not extend beyond the year 2012 because this was the last year 
for which all of the above data was available.  
We tested our hypotheses using two different statistical approaches. The first approach estimated three 
lagged regression model for country level cross sectional data of each year independently. We lagged our 
independent variables by one year behind the dependent variable, consistent with other country-level 
analysis (Krishnan 2013), to account for the temporal nature of the effects of ICT penetration on 
corruption as well as reverse causality. We also conducted a two-year lagged analysis with almost identical 
results, which are not reported here to conserve space.  Our lagged regression model was as follows: 
Model 1: (CPI / COC) =  β + βROL() + βICT() + βGDP() + βPS() + βLIT() +     (1) 
where, n was the lag between the dependent and independent variables in years (n=1 for years 2011-
2013).  
In the second approach, we tested our hypothesis using a multilevel random effects model (see equation 4 
below) (Hox 2002).  This model was estimated on combined observations for all three years at two levels 
where level 1 unit consisted of the repeated measures for each country and level 2 units were countries 
themselves (Hoffman and Rovine 2007). We obtained a longitudinal as well as cross-sectional panel data 
structure with a total of 291 observations (3x97) with repeated measures nested within countries. 
Multilevel modeling is gaining popularity due to improving computational resources (Ma et al. 2014; 
Hohlfeld et al. 2008; Linnakyla 2001).Multilevel modeling allowed to control for variability in the existing 
level of corruption across countries (equation 3) and gave us generalizable estimates of the explanatory 
variables by incorporating the variability across countries as random effects. A preliminary analysis of CPI 
scores in the new data structure yielded an interclass correlation coefficient (ICC) of 98% indicating very 
high variability between groups (country-level) than within groups (year-level) (Heck and Thomas, 1999). 
Modeling country-level and year-level variables separately gave us more reliable estimates of the 
parameters. We introduced literacy (LIT) as a level 2 (country level) predictor in our model because (a) it 
could explain variability in existing level of corruption; and (b) measurement constraints made it a 
country-specific variable (single observations for all three years). 
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 (CPI /COC) =  β + βROL() + βICT() + βGDP() + βPS() + βLIT() +     (2) 
β  = γ + γLIT() + u   (3) 
Model 2 (mixed model):   (CPI /COC) = γ + γLIT()  + βROL() + βICT() + βGDP() + 
βPS()  +	u 	+	      (4) 
In the complete/mixed model (Model 2), the level 2 error term  u  was distributed normally with 
variance	τ. CPI represented corruption in a country ‘i’ at time t (year). Model 2 was estimated using 
restricted maximum likelihood estimation (RMLE) for reliable estimates with small group size (3 years). 
Similar to model (1) we factored in a lag time of one year (n=1) to account for reverse causality and delay 
in effect of explanatory variables on country-level corruption (Krishnan et al. 2013).  
Results  
Table 1 depicts bivariate correlations between our variables of interest. The two corruption measures, CPI 
and COC, were highly correlated (r=0.99) providing confidence in our measure of the dependent variable. 
Each of these constructs are also correlated with IT penetration (ICT) (r-0.74) and rule of law (RUL) 
(r=0.58, 0.56). As a test for multicollinearity, we compared VIF values for model 1 across all the three 
years, which ranged from 1.45 to 2.64; less than the maximum limit of 4.0.  
Table 1.  Correlation between variables 
  CPI COC ROL ICT GDP LIT PS 
CPI 1.00       
COC 0.99 1.00      
ROL 0.58 0.56 1.00     
ICT 0.74 0.74 0.30 1.00    
GDP 0.58 0.58 0.06 0.66 1.00   
LIT 0.38 0.39 0.34 0.56 0.38 1.00 
 PS 0.69 0.69 0.57 0.52 0.42 0.42 1.00 
 
Coefficient estimates and their significance are shown in Table 2(a) and 2(b) for COC and CPI as measures 
of corruption. As seen in these tables, total ICT penetration (ICT) had significant positive associations 
(p<0.05) with both measures of corruption (COC and CPI) for each of the three years of analysis (2011-
2013). Since COC and CPI were reverse-coded measures, these results confirmed that increasing ICT 
penetration leads to lower corruption, consistent with Hypothesis H1. Rule of law (ROL) was negatively 
related to corruption (reverse of COC and CPI) for each of the three years, supporting Hypothesis H2. A 
rerun of our analysis with a two-year lag between corruption (2013) and ICT penetration and rule of law 
(2011) found similar results, confirming the robustness of our findings across two different measures of 
corruption (from two sources), three different years of analysis (2011-2013), and two different time lags 
(n=1, 2). Partial F-test comparing the total variance explained in a baseline model with only control 
variables versus the hypothesized model with independent and control variables found that the R-square 
increase from the baseline model to the hypothesized model was significant for all lags and all years under 
consideration. This analysis confirmed that ICT penetration and rule of law added significant explanatory 
power in our model over and above the control variables. 
In order to determine the relative strength of the effect of the predictor variables (ICT, ROL, GDP, LIT 
and PS) on explanatory variable (CPI/COC) in model 1 we obtained the standardized regression 
coefficients by estimating the model using z-scores of all variables (mean of 0; variance of 1). For the years 
2012 and 2013, ICT penetration had the highest influence on CPI or COC compared to other independent 
variables (table 2(a)). A one standard deviation change in ICT penetration produced more change in the 
CPI/COC than any other predictor variables for these years. As an example, for year 2013 Std. β of ICT 
against COC is 0.41 (table 2(a)) implying that an increase in ICT penetration a year before (2012) by 0.7 
(Std. deviation of ICT for 2012) increases the COC measure by 0.41*0.69 where 0.69 is Std. deviation of 
COC for 2013. ROL also had an effect that was comparable to other control variables on corruption 
measures.  
Among the three control variables, GDP per capita (GDP) had a significant negative effect on corruption 
(Std. β≈0.23 to 0.4) and political stability (PS) had a high negative effect (Std. β≈0.20 to 3.50) as 
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expected. However, literacy rate (LIT) had a significant positive effect on corruption, opposite of what was 
expected, although the strength of this relationship was the weakest amongst all variables (Std. β ≈ -0.16 
to -0.13). Similar findings were observed in some recent corruption studies (Saha and Su 2012; Saha et al. 
2009), which were attributed to the limited variability in the literacy rate across the countries (Belasen 
and Peyton 2011).  
Table 2a Estimates of Model 1 (lag=1) for COC 
 COC 
Year 2011 2012 2013 
 β Std. β β Std. β β Std. β 
(Intercept) -1.50* NA -1.60* NA -1.83* NA 
Rule of Law (ROL) 0.14* 0.41* 0.09* 0.20* 0.10* 0.28* 
ICT penetration (ICT) 0.25* 0.27* 0.33* 0.32* 0.42* 0.41* 
GDP/Capita (GDP) 0.00* 0.28* 0.00* 0.27* 0.00* 0.21* 
Literacy (LIT) -0.01* -0.13* 0.00 -0.2 -0.01* -0.14* 
Political Stability (PS) 0.21* 0.25* 0.25* 0.27* 0.21* 0.26* 
Adj. R. Squared 0.74 0.73 0.71 
F-statistic 54.67 52.13 49.57 
*p<0.05 
 
Table 2b Estimates of Model 1 (lag=1) for CPI 
 CPI 
Year 2011 2012 2013 
 
β 
Std. 
β 
β 
Std. β 
β 
Std. β 
(Intercept) 1.74* NA 14.73* NA 10.63* NA 
Rule of Law (ROL) 0.18* 0.26* 2.04* 0.32* 2.32* 0.34* 
ICT penetration (ICT) 0.35* 0.18* 6.33* 0.33* 7.44* 0.38* 
GDP/Capita (GDP) 0.00* 0.4* 0.00* 0.27* 0.00* 0.23* 
Literacy (LIT) -0.01 -0.09 -0.10* -0.13* -0.13* -0.16* 
Political Stability (PS) 0.43* 0.25* 4.64* 0.28* 4.36* 0.27* 
Adj. R. Squared 0.61 0.75 0.75 
F-statistic 30.79 59.41 61.10 
*p<0.05 
 
Table 3. Estimates for Model 2 (lag=1) 
Fixed Effects  
Response COC CPI 
Intercept (γ) -0.31* 4.62* 
Rule of Law (β) 0.134* 0.20* 
ICT penetration (β) 0.083* 0.64* 
GDP/Capita (β) 0.001* 0.001* 
Literacy (γ) 0.001 -0.001* 
Political Stability  (β) 0.082* 0.35* 
Deviance -118.35 531 
*p<0.05 
 Random Effects 
Level 2 Variance (u) 0.38* 0.43* 
Level 1  Variance (	) 0.09* 0.15* 
 
Parameter estimates of the multilevel mixed model (Model 2) are shown in Table 3 above. After 
controlling for variability in corruption scores across countries using a random intercept, we find 
significant evidence of negative relationship of CPI with ICT and ROL. The estimates of GDP and PS are 
 ICT and Corruption 
  
 Twenty-first Americas Conference on Information Systems, Puerto Rico, 2015 9 
also consistent with the past literature. However, the relationship between LIT and COC is non-significant 
and is positive for CPI, implying higher literacy leads to higher corruption. As discussed earlier this 
opposite and insignificant relationship can be attributed to lesser variability in the literacy rate across 
countries over time and less frequent updates of the literacy measure (Saha and Gounder 2013; Belasen 
and Peyton 2011). Another possible reason for this finding may be that the perceived corruption measured 
through surveys is higher for a literate society because of the people’s understanding of corruption and 
concern for it. Research has shown that it is impossible to measure corruption based on any hard 
empirical data such as number of bribes reported or prosecutions, but that it is best measured through 
citizens and business perception about corruption (Transparency International 2011). We leave further 
investigation on the corruption and literacy relationship for the future research. In summary, higher 
relative influence of ICT penetration (ICT) and rule of law (ROL) in determining corruption across 
countries supports the proposed theoretical perspective outlined in the study.   
Conclusion and Discussion  
The study empirically investigated the relationship between ICT penetration among businesses, 
government, and citizens in a country and its level of corruption. While prior studies have demonstrated 
that ICT may help reduce corruption, they did not present a theoretical rationale as to why it could be so. 
Furthermore, there were inconsistencies between measures of corruption between these studies and 
sometimes-conflicting effects were reported, making it hard to reconcile differences between studies.   
We addressed these gaps in the literature by using a theoretical approach to studying corruption, and 
testing our hypotheses using multiple measures of corruption, multiple years of analysis, and multiple 
analytic models.  Using the theoretical lens of general deterrence theory, we argued that the higher the 
certainty and severity of punishment related to corruption, the greater would be the deterrence against 
corruption. ICT penetration among nation’s citizens, businesses, and government creates vast amount of 
information resources, provides tools to store, search, and analyze that data, and mechanisms to share the 
data among multiple parties involved in a corruption investigation. This increased level of monitoring as 
well as unobtrusive collection and analysis of corruption-related data can be utilized by investigators to 
prosecute white-collar crimes like corruption. By increasing the certainty of criminals being caught during 
or after the act of corruption, ICT can help reduce corruption. As per GDT, countries with higher rule of 
law should have less corruption by increasing the severity of punishment for corrupt acts. These effects 
were confirmed in our empirical analysis, while accounting for political, social, and economic controls. 
Our analysis was robust across multiple measures of corruption (COC and CPI), three different years of 
analysis (2011-2013), and with single level (regression) and multilevel (mixed effect model) statistical 
analyses.  
To the best of our knowledge, this study is possibly the first to investigate the relationship between ICT 
and corruption using a theoretical perspective, and investigate the robustness of the relationship using a 
variety of methods. Based on our findings, we recommend that countries with high level of corruption 
consider investing in ICT tools to reduce corruption within its borders. However, we caution that ICT is 
not a cure-all solution for global corruption. Countries must also invest in building rule of law, through 
legal and judicial institutions, in order to realize the most benefit from their ICT investments. We also 
hope that our study will stimulate future studies to further explore the ICT-corruption link, the contingent 
factors under which this effect is strong versus weak, and additional factors that may enable or constrain 
the impact of ICT on corruption.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1 (Constructs and their measures) 
 
Construct  Measure  Source  Components  
ICT 
Penetration  
Total ICT usage 
Sub Index (Scale 
: 0 (low usage) 
The Global IT 
Report 
(2010-12) 
Individual Usage: mobile phones subscription, individuals 
using internet, households with PC, households with 
internet access, use of social networks. 
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to 10 (high 
usage)  
 
 
Business Usage: Firm level technology absorption, 
capacity for innovation, business internet use, extent of 
staff training 
Government Usage: Government prioritization of ICT, 
importance of ICT to government vision, Government 
Online Service Index. 
Penalty for 
Corrupt 
Rule of Law 
(ROL)  
Scale: -2.5 (low) 
to 2.5 (high) 
Tranforma-
tion Index 
BTI (2010-
12) 
Separations of power, Independent Judiciary, Prosecution 
of office abuse, Civil Rights  
Corruption Control of 
Corruption 
(COC) 
Scale: -2.5 (low) 
– 2.5 (high) 
Worldwide 
Governance 
indicator 
(2011-13) 
Corruption among public officials, Diversion of Public 
Funds, Irregular Payments, Level of corruption between 
(Administration and citizens, local businesses, foreign 
companies) , spread of corruption 
Corruption 
Perception 
Index (CPI) 
Scale : 0 (high 
corruption) to 
10 (low corrupt-
tion) 
Transparency 
International 
(2011-13) 
Accountability of  (Executives and public employees,  
Public Funds),Government Control over Corruption, 
Bribery for contracts and Favor, Anti-corruption 
Initiatives, Perception of corruption by Business People, 
Social Tolerance towards corruption 
Political 
Control 
Political 
Stability (PS)  
Scale: -2.5 (low) 
– 2.5 (high) 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicator 
(2010-12) 
Orderly transfers, Armed conflict, Violent demonstrations,  
Social Unrest, International tensions,  Frequency of 
political killings ,  Frequency of disappearances, Political 
terror scale ,  Security Risk Rating, Intensity of Internal 
conflicts  
Social 
Control 
Literacy Rate 
(LIT) 
(percentage) 
World Bank  
(2010-12) 
Total is the percentage of the population age 15 and above 
who can, with understanding, read and write a short, 
simple statement on their everyday life. 
Economic 
Control 
GDP/ Capita 
(GDP) (Dollars)  
World Bank 
(2010-12) 
GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident 
producers in the economy plus any product taxes and 
minus any subsidies not included in the value of the 
products.  
 
 
Table A2  (List of countries) 
 
Albania Ecuador Malaysia South Korea 
Algeria Egypt Mali Serbia 
Argentina El Salvador Mauritania Singapore 
Armenia Estonia Mauritius Slovakia 
Azerbaijan Ethiopia Mexico Slovenia 
Bahrain Georgia Mongolia South Africa 
Bangladesh Ghana Montenegro Sri Lanka 
Benin Guatemala Morocco Syria 
Bolivia Honduras Mozambique Taiwan 
Bosnia Hungary Namibia Tajikistan 
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Botswana India Nepal Tanzania 
Brazil Indonesia Nicaragua Thailand 
Bulgaria Jamaica Nigeria Tunisia 
Burkina Jordan Oman Turkey 
Burundi Kazakhstan Pakistan United Arab Emirates 
Côte d'Ivoire Kenya Panama Uganda 
Cambodia Kuwait Paraguay Ukraine 
Cameroon Kyrgyz Peru Uruguay 
Chad Latvia Philippines Venezuela 
Chile Lesotho Poland Vietnam 
China Libya Qatar Zambia 
Colombia Lithuania Romania Zimbabwe 
Costa Macedonia Russia   
Croatia Madagascar Saudi Arabia   
Czech Malawi Senegal   
 
